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CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE OF INACTIVE DRUG METABOLITES IN DUI
CASES: USING A PROXIMATE CAUSE ANALYSIS TO FILL THE EVIDENTIARY
GAP BETWEEN PRIOR DRUG USE AND DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
David was pulled over one morning for speeding.' His speech was
slurred and his eyes were bloodshot.2 The police officer administered a brea-
thalyzer test and it yielded a .00 blood alcohol content reading.3 The officer
then took David to a hospital where, approximately ninety minutes later, a
blood sample was taken.' A cocaine metabolite known as benzolectamine
was found in David's blood.5 This metabolite was evidence that David had
ingested cocaine at some point in the past.6
A certified drug recognition expert concluded that, while David was
not under the pharmacological influence of cocaine at the time of driving, he
was experiencing a "rebound effect" from a cocaine high. On June 28,
2007, the appellate division of the Superior Court of New Jersey used this
concept of a "cocaine hangover" to secure David's conviction for driving
under the influence (DUI).8 The court held that David's prior ingestion of
cocaine had caused his "cocaine hangover," and thus had proximately
caused his impaired driving.9 No consideration was given to either the quan-
tity of cocaine metabolites found in David's blood, or the amount of time
that had passed since his ingestion of the cocaine.l°





6. See John P. Apol & Stacey M. Studnicki, Criminal Law for the 2005-2006 Term, 53
WAYNE L. REv. 183, 192 (2007) (examining two Michigan DUI cases that were consolidated
on appeal, under the name People v. Derror, to consider the evidentiary significance of mari-
juana metabolites). See also Jason Dimitris, Life After Law School: Experience in the Miami-
Dade County State Attorney's Office, 29 STETSON L. REv. 1303, 1309-10 (2000) (briefly
discussing a DUI Florida case involving cocaine metabolites, as an example of the wide
variety and complexity of cases prosecuted in Miami-Dade County). See also People v. Der-
ror, 706 N.W.2d 451, 454 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (considering expert testimony that the pres-
ence of marijuana metabolites in the defendant's blood is an indication that the defendant
used marijuana at some point in the past), rev'd on other grounds, 715 N.W.2d 822 (Mich.
2006).
7. Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 747.
8. Id. at 746.
9. Id. at 749.
10. See id. at 745.
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The Arkansas legislature should take heed of the Driving Under the In-
fluence of Drugs (DUID) legislation in Nevada, Ohio, and Virginia, under
which specific quantitative levels of various controlled substances or their
metabolites must be detected in order to create a per se presumption of im-
pairment.11 This legislation stops juridical bias and over-reaching judicial
interpretation at the courthouse doors. Arkansas needs to enact a law mi-
micking those of Nevada, Ohio and Virginia, to the extent that they specify
detectable amounts of controlled substances and their active metabolites. 2
However, an Arkansas law should explicitly exclude pharmacologically
inactive metabolites from the realm of possible evidence.
The first section of this note examines the evidentiary problem that
drug metabolites pose. The background section will take an in depth look at
drug metabolites, and consider the reliability of different drug-testing proce-
dures. It will then look at the Arkansas Rules of Evidence and examine how
metabolites are typically used as evidence in the courtroom. Next, the ques-
tionable decisions of ERC Contractor Yard & Sales v. Robertson 13 and
State v. Franchetta4 will be compared. The note will also examine a contro-
versial decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan in People v. Derror 5
The section will close with a look at the current Arkansas DUI law, as com-
pared to the laws of Nevada, Ohio, and Virginia. 6 In conclusion, this note
proposes that: (1) inactive metabolites be removed from the realm of cir-
cumstantial evidence in DUI cases, and (2) the Arkansas legislature adopt a
law similar to those of Nevada, Ohio, or Virginia, modified to the extent of
eliminating inactive metabolites from legal consideration.
II. THE PROBLEM
David's case 17 was not the beginning of this line of cases. The prox-
imate cause test was applied a few years earlier by the same New Jersey
appellate court in an attempt to connect a defendant's prior marijuana inges-
tion to his impaired driving. 1" A marijuana metabolite was found in the de-
11. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.379 (West 2009); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19
(West 2009); VA. CODE ANN § 18.2-266 (West 2009). See also infra Part III.G.2.
12. Id.
13. 335 Ark. 63, 977 S.W.2d 212 (1998).
14. 925 A.2d 745 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).
15. 715 N.W.2d 822 (Mich. 2006).
16. Id. See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-103 (West 2009). Although this note refers to
the states' driving laws as their DUI (driving under the influence) laws, technically, Arkan-
sas, Ohio, and Virginia entitle their laws "Driving While Intoxicated," "Operation of Motor
Vehicle While Intoxicated," and "Driving Motor Vehicle, While Intoxicated," respectively.
17. See supra Part I.
18. State v. Bealor, 872 A.2d 1081, 1085 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005), rev'd, 902
A.2d 226 (N.J. 2006).
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fendant's urine, and a state trooper testified about the defendant's erratic
driving, slurred speech, and bloodshot eyes. 9 Nevertheless, the court found
for the defendant because there was no testimony about the effect of mariju-
ana on the defendant. 20 There was no testimony to link the prior drug use to
the defendant's impaired driving.2' The causal chain was broken.22
The appellate court went on to note that the trial court record did not
specify the amount of marijuana metabolites found in the defendant's
urine.23 Contrary to the appellate court's reasoning, the trial judge concluded
that evidence of any quantity of drug or drug metabolite was sufficient for
conviction of DUI.2' The appellate court overruled this conclusion as creat-
ing a per se rule, where any evidence of a drug or drug metabolite automati-
cally gives rise to a presumption of DUI.25
Sixteen states have actually enacted such per se laws under the title of
Driving Under the Influence of Drugs (DUID). 26 Under these laws, any de-
tectable amount of drugs or drug metabolites creates a presumption of im-
pairment.27 Three of these states-Nevada, Ohio, and Virginia-actually
specify quantitative levels of various controlled substances and their meta-
bolites that must be detected in order to create a per se presumption of im-
pairment.28
The majority of states, however, do not have per se DUI laws for
drugs.29 Instead, they maintain only various forms of the standard DUI law,
commonly stating that it is illegal to drive (1) with a blood alcohol concen-
19. Id. at 1083.
20. Id. at 1086. This appellate court finding was reversed a year later on the grounds that
testimony as to the effect of marijuana on the defendant was not needed. State v. Bealor, 902
A.2d 226, 236 (N.J. 2006). The Supreme Court of New Jersey argued that the evidence, when
considered in the aggregate, was enough to allow a jury to infer that marijuana caused the
defendant's impairment. Id.
21. Bealor, 872 A.2d at 1086-87.
22. See id. at 1085-86.
23. Id. at 1085.
24. Id. at 1086.
25. Id.
26. Charles R. Cordova, Jr., DWI and Drugs: A Look at Per Se Laws for Marijuana, 7
NEV. L.J. 570,571 n.12 (2007) (listing the sixteen states with DUID statute); see also Mark F.
Lewis & Betty J. Buchan, The Drugged Driver and the Need for a "Per Se" Law, 72 FLA.
B.J. 32, 36-38 (1998) (considering the justification for DUID per se laws-the fact that it is
too difficult to prove the causal link between drug ingestion and subsequent impairment-
and offering up a prototype per se law for Florida).
27. Lewis & Buchan, supra note 26, at 35.
28. Cordova, Jr., supra note 26, at 571 n.12; see NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.379 (West
2009); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (West 2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (West
2009). Throughout this note, the impaired driving laws of these three states will be referred to
as DUI/DUID laws because all three contain both alcohol (DUJI) and drug (DUID) provi-
sions.
29. Cordova, Jr., supra note 26, at 571.
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tration (BAC) of .08% or higher, or (2) under the influence of a controlled
substance.3" There is a specified amount of alcohol that must be present in
the blood in order to create a per se presumption of alcohol impairment."
There are no such specifications listed for controlled substances.
32
This lack of specificity leads to controversial decisions.33 Scientific im-
provements in drug testing procedures are beginning to render this imprecise
language susceptible to over-reaching judicial interpretation. 34 Unlike alco-
30. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-103 (West 2009) (simply stating that it is against
the law in Arkansas to drive while intoxicated, or with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC)
of .08%); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:98 (West 2009) (stating that it is unlawful in Louisiana to
operate a vehicle while under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance, or with a
BAC of .08%); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-11-30 (West 2009) (stating that it is illegal in Missis-
sippi to drive under the influence of any substance that has impaired the driver's ability to
drive, or with a BAC of .08%); see also FindLaw: State DUI Laws,
http://dui.findlaw.com/dui/state-dui-law (last visited Mar. 9, 2009) (listing each state name as
a link to that state's DI law). But see, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (West 2009).
The Ohio DUI/DUID law begins with the .08% BAC specification. Id. It continues on, how-
ever, to lay out similar specifications for a variety of different drugs and their metabolites. Id.
For example, it is against Ohio law to drive with a "concentration of cocaine metabolite in the
person's urine of at least one hundred fifty nanograms of cocaine metabolite per milliliter of
the person's urine." Id.
31. See supra note 30.
32. See supra note 30.
33. See generally People v. Derror, 715 N.W.2d 822 (Mich. 2006) (holding that the
defendant was guilty of DUI, regardless of actual intoxication, because he had a marijuana
metabolite in his system at the time of driving); State v. Bealor, 902 A.2d 226 (N.J. 2006)
(using circumstantial evidence and the presence of marijuana metabolites to convict the de-
fendant of DUI); State v. Franchetta, 925 A.2d 745 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (using
circumstantial evidence and the presence of inactive cocaine metabolites to convict the de-
fendant of DII); see also Lindsay Calhoun, Michigan's Operating While Intoxicated Statute:
The Possible Ramifications of the Michigan Supreme Court's Decision in People v. Derror,
53 WAYNE L. REv. 1125, 1146 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court of Michigan was
given free reign over Michigan's DUI law because the legislature failed to specify that a
driver must be actually intoxicated); Lewis & Buchan, supra note 26, at 34 (examining a
Florida trial judge's belief that evidence of even a small amount of marijuana is significant
for the simple reason that it provides a possible explanation for the defendant's impairment).
34. See Calhoun, supra note 33, at 1141 ("scientists generally agree that substances such
as marijuana and cocaine are detectible in the body long after the psychoactive effects of the
drug are gone"); Franklin J. Hogue & Laura D. Hogue, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 52
MERCER L. REv. 167, 189 (2000) (briefly discussing a DII case in which paint fumes regis-
tered on a breath test); Mark P. Stevens & James R. Addison, Interface of Science & Law in
Drug Testing, 23 CHAMPION 18, 21 (Dec. 1999) (charting a variety of drugs, including alco-
hol, and the different lengths of time that can pass between ingestion and testing positive-
i.e. chronic abusers of cocaine can excrete detectable amounts of cocaine metabolites for
weeks after their last dose); see also State v. Norton, No. 03C01-9707-CR-00270, 1999 WL
508654, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 20, 1999) (listing the quantities of various drugs and
drug metabolites detected in the defendant's blood-even detecting one drug at a quantity
below the lowest quantifiable level for the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation). See generally
Graham v. Turnage Employment Group, 60 Ark. App. 150, 960 S.W.2d 453 (1998) (denying
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hol, the metabolic remnants of some controlled substances-namely cocaine
and marijuana-can be detected weeks and even months after ingestion.35
Also unlike alcohol, some of the remnants are pharmacologically inactive,
meaning that they have no effect on the mind or body.36 Yet, these remnants
are being given varied levels of evidentiary weight toward determining
whether a defendant was "under the influence" at the time of driving.37
Outside of the sixteen states that have adopted DUID laws with the per
se presumption of drug impairment, judges are free to set a per se presump-
tion of impairment at any level of drugs or metabolites detected, even at
miniscule amounts, and even if the metabolites are pharmacologically inac-
tive.38 Most judges choose to treat evidence of drug metabolites as mere
circumstantial evidence that is, by itself, inadmissible in DUI cases. 39 They
are considered circumstantial evidence of prior drug use, and as such, they
workers' compensation to the defendant because marijuana metabolites were detected in his
urine, and ignoring the defendant's testimony that he smoked marijuana seventeen days be-
fore the accident).
35. See Stevens & Addison, supra note 34, at 21 (charting alcohol as detectable in urine
up to 24 hours after consumption, while metabolites of marijuana are detectable in urine up to
two months after ingestion; metabolites of cocaine up to a few weeks; opiates a few days;
barbiturates up to or longer than one month, etc.).
36. See Calhoun, supra note 33, at 1135 (discussing the metabolization of marijuana);
see also People v. Derror, 715 N.W.2d 822, 830 (Mich. 2006) (acknowledging that the mari-
juana metabolite, 1 1-carboxy-THC, had no pharmacological effect on the defendant); State v.
Franchetta, 925 A.2d 745, 747 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (acknowledging that the
cocaine metabolite, benzolectamine, had no pharmacological influence on the defendant
while he was driving).
37. Compare Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 749 (giving the inactive cocaine metabolite, ben-
zolectamine, a high level of evidentiary weight-using it to both (1) show prior ingestion of
cocaine, and (2) establish the prior ingestion as proximate cause of the defendant's impaired
driving) with State v. McClain, 525 So.2d 420, 422 (Fla. 1988) (giving a trace amount of
cocaine no evidentiary weight at all-barring the cocaine from evidentiary consideration due
to its low probative value, and high risk for unfair prejudice).
38. See Calhoun, supra note 33, at 1143 (arguing that the Michigan legislature needs to
specify drug and metabolite quantities in the Michigan DUI law in order to prevent the Mich-
igan judiciary from arbitrarily legislating its own specific quantities); Hogue & Hogue, supra
note 34, at 181-82 (briefly discussing how evidence of marijuana metabolites constitutes a
per se violation of Georgia DUI law); Lewis & Buchan, supra note 26, at 34 (examining a
Florida trial judge's belief that evidence of even a small amount of marijuana is significant
for the simple reason that it provides a possible explanation for the defendant's impairment).
See also People v. Derror, 715 N.W.2d 822, 836 (Mich. 2006). The Supreme Court of Michi-
gan held that the defendant was guilty of DUI, regardless of actual impairment, because he
had a marijuana metabolite in his system at the time of driving. Id. The Michigan legislature
failed to specify that a person must be impaired while driving in order to be guilty of DUI. Id.
at 830.
39. See, e.g., State v. Bealor, 902 A.2d 226, 231 (N.J. 2006); Buckles v. State, 830 P.2d
702, 706 (Wyo. 1992); Robinson v. State, 98 Ark. App. 237, 243, 254 S.W.3d 750, 754
(2007). Cf Mace v. State, 328 Ark. 536, 539, 944 S.W.2d 830, 832 (1997) (laying out the
definitions of "sufficient evidence" and "circumstantial evidence").
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carry with them the probative value of making it more probable that the de-
fendant was "under the influence" of the drug at the time of driving.4 °
What is not currently considered in the courts is the pharmacological
activity of the metabolites.4" Because the metabolite of a drug is circumstan-
tial evidence of prior ingestion of the drug itself, it is deemed to hold at least
some probative value toward proving intoxication, regardless of its activi-
ty.42 It would seem that a pharmacologically active metabolite would hold
more probative value than an inactive metabolite. Unfortunately, this con-
sideration is left largely untouched43 because the concern is centered on
whether a defendant is "under the influence" of a controlled substance; me-
tabolites are not considered controlled substances." Thus, the mental or
physical influence of a drug's metabolite is inconsequential. Nevertheless,
the metabolite of a controlled substance retains probative value toward prov-
ing that the defendant was under the influence of the drug itself at some
point in the past.45
The question is how far in the past-one month ago, one week ago, or
one hour ago-was the defendant was still behind the wheel of his or her
car? It is at this unclear stage of the proof that some judges-like the judges
of the New Jersey appellate court4 -apply a proximate cause analysis.47
40. See State v. McClain, 525 So.2d 420, 421 & 423 (Fla. 1988).
41. See, e.g., Derror, 715 N.W.2d at 830; Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 207. But see Williams
v. State, 710 So.2d 24, 40 n.32 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (Cope, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) ("Because illegal substances may be detected in a urine test days or weeks
after use... , it is possible for a test to be positive after all active effect of the substance has
worn off. Upon a showing that the detected amount could not cause, or contribute to, the
driver's impairment, presumably the driver would be entitled to have the test result ex-
cluded.").
42. See Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 747; People v. McAfee, 104 P.3d 226, 228 (Colo. App.
2004); McClain, 525 So.2d at 422. Contra West v. State, 553 So.2d 254, 255 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1989) (deciding that a trace amount of valium detected in the defendant had no
probative value because it had no measurable effect on defendant's driving).
43. See supra note 41.
44. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-103 (West 2009) ("It is unlawful and punishable
as provided in this act for any person who is intoxicated to operate or be in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle.") with ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-102 (West 2009) (defining "intox-
icated" as being under the influence or affected by a controlled substance, and defining "con-
trolled substance" as being a drug, substance, or immediate precursor in Schedules I through
IV) and ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-64-203, 205, 207 & 209 (West 2009) (outlining what sub-
stances can fall under the respective categories of Schedule I through IV) and Timothy P.
Wile, Pennsylvania's "New Improved" Implied Consent Law-Not Just for DUI Offenders
Anymore, 77 PA. B. AsS'N Q. 121, 138 n.112 (July 2006) (noting that the Department of
Health distinguishes between Schedule I through III controlled substances, and their metabo-
lites). But see Derror, 715 N.W.2d at 831 (holding that the marijuana metabolite, 1 I-
carboxy-THC, is a Schedule I controlled substance).
45. See supra note 42.
46. See supra Part H.
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This analysis helps to bridge the evidentiary gap between driving impaired
and ingesting a controlled substance at some point in the past.48 In David's
case,49 the bridge was given a name: the cocaine "hangover.
50
The problem with applying the proximate cause analysis to bridge this
gap is that it effectively disguises evidence of a defendant's prior bad act as
an attempt to prove an element of DUI.5 Unlike a positive BAC test result,
which helps to show that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the
test, a positive test result for pharmacologically inactive metabolites does no
such thing.52 On the contrary, evidence of inactive metabolites helps to show
that the defendant was not intoxicated at the time of the test. 3
Yet, because the presence of inactive metabolites also helps to show
that the defendant ingested a controlled substance at some point in the past,
it gets admitted into evidence as an attempt to prove an element of DUI,
namely that the defendant was "under the influence" of the controlled sub-
47. E.g., Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 749; State v. Bealor, 872 A.2d 1081, 1085 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2005); Buckles v. State, 830 P.2d 702, 707-08 (Wyo. 1992).
48. E.g., Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 749; Bealor, 872 A.2d at 1085; Buckles, 830 P.2d at
706 (explaining why the presence of cocaine metabolites in the defendant's system was rele-
vant).
49. See supra Parts I-II.
50. Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 746.
51. See ARK. R. EVID. 404(b) (stating that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may
be admissible to prove opportunity or preparation); see also Phavixay v. State, 373 Ark. 168,
170, 282 S.W.3d 795, 797 (2008) (stating that a prior bad act must be independently relevant
to the main issue in the case, tending to prove a material element in the case, as opposed to
proving merely that the defendant is a criminal). Evidence of a drug's metabolite is evidence
of prior ingestion of such drug. State v. McClain, 525 So.2d 420, 422 (Fla. 1988). The prior
ingestion of the drug is a prior bad act-possession of a controlled substance--other than the
one being proved--driving under the influence. But see Daniel D. Blinka & Thomas J.
Hammer, Court of Appeals Digest, 71 Wis. LAw. 38, 38 (Oct. 1998) (recognizing the majori-
ty rule that mere presence of a controlled substance in one's urine or blood, without more, is
not sufficient to prove possession). However, this prior bad act of ingestion is useful toward
proving the opportunity to be intoxicated at the time of driving. Being intoxicated at the time
of driving is a material element of DU. See ARK. CODE AN. § 5-65-103(a) (West 2009).
52. See Cordova, Jr., supra note 26, at 591 (arguing that a positive test result for a low
level of metabolites is irrelevant evidence); Calhoun, supra note 33, at 1138 (discussing the
inaccuracies of drug testing techniques for cocaine); see also State v. Bealor, 902 A.2d 226,
231 (N.J. 2006) (considering the defendant's argument that "it would be 'a leap of faith' to
conclude that 'having some substance in your urine [means] being under the influence of it;
Brown v. Ala. Elec. Co., 60 Ark. App. 138, 149, 959 S.W.2d 753, 758 (1998) (Griffen, J.,
dissenting) ("It makes no more sense to call a marijuana metabolite marijuana than to call
carbon monoxide gasoline.").
53. See Edward L. Fiandach, The Offense: Drug-Influenced Operating Offenses, 1
HANDLING DRUNK DRIVING CASES § 2.8 (June 2008) (offering a direct examination during
which "pharmacological activity" was defined as affecting, altering or influencing either the
functioning of the brain or different organs in the body); see also Franchetta, 925 A.2d at
747; Derror, 715 N.W.2d at 830.
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stance, not at the time of the test, but at the time of driving.54 Thus, the evi-
dence of metabolites would be admitted as circumstantial evidence under
one of the exceptions-opportunity or preparation-to Rule 404 of the Ar-
kansas Rules of Evidence.55
The probative value of pharmacologically inactive metabolites, howev-
er, is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice that can be
caused by evidence of prior bad acts.56 Instead of supporting an element of
DUI, evidence of prior drug use does little more than support a jury mentali-
ty of "once a drug-user, always a drug-user. 5 7 For this reason, evidence of
inactive drug metabolites in DUI cases should be considered inadmissible
under Rule 403 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence.58
III. BACKGROUND
In order to fully grasp the problem presented by this controversial law,
background information is necessary. The first section will define drug me-
tabolites and examine different drug-testing procedures.59 The second sec-
tion will look at the evidentiary hurdles of Rules 403 and 404 of the Arkan-
sas Rules of Evidence, and attempt to ascertain how evidence of pharmaco-
logically inactive metabolites makes it into the courtroom.6" In the third sec-
tion, ERC Contractor Yard & Sales v. Robertson,6' a worker's compensation
case involving alcohol withdrawal, will be compared with State v. Franchet-
ta,62 the DUI case involving a "cocaine hangover., 63 The fourth section will
review People v. Derror6 in which the Supreme Court of Michigan decided
to expand the coverage of the Michigan DUI law to include those driving
54. See supra note 51.
55. See ARK. R. EVID. 404(b).
56. See McClain, 525 So.2d at 422; Williams v. State, 710 So.2d 24, 40 n.32 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (Cope, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Cordova, Jr., supra note
26, at 589 (arguing that evidence of prior drug use is being used to characterize defendants as
law breakers). Compare ARK. R. EVID. 404 with ARK. R. EVID. 403 (stating that relevant
"evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice").
57. See Cordova, Jr., supra note 26, at 588-91 (arguing that evidence of drug metabo-
lites can equate to character evidence of a prior bad act); see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Ex-
ecutives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's
holding was guided by society's utter disdain toward illegal drug use).
58. See ARK. R. EVID. 403 (stating that relevant evidence can be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice against the defendant).
59. See infra Part I1I.A.
60. See infra Part III.B.
61. 335 Ark. 63, 977 S.W.2d 212 (1998).
62. 925 A.2d 745 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).
63. See infra Part III.C.
64. 715 N.W.2d 822 (Mich. 2006).
[Vol. 32
CRIMINAL LAW
with any amount of drug metabolites in their body, regardless of the phar-
macological activity of the metabolite, and regardless of whether the driver
was actually impaired.65 Finally, Arkansas's current DUI law will be
matched up against the DUI/DUID laws of Nevada, Ohio and Virginia.66
A. The Problem with Metabolites
This section of the note will begin by explaining what metabolites are
and how they are produced. It will then follow up with a brief discussion of
the four types of body specimens that are analyzed for drugs, as well as two
different drug testing procedures. The section will conclude with a look at
the overall relevance and reliability of drug tests.
1. Metabolites Defined
Once a drug is ingested, the body begins to break it down through the
process of metabolism. 67 The process begins with the activation of the pri-
mary chemical component of the drug, intoxicating the mind and body and
typically producing a "high., 68 After all of the primary chemicals have been
activated, a second phase of deactivation begins and the mind and body be-
gin to detoxify. 69 It is during this phase that most of the major drug metabo-
lites are produced as intermediate products of metabolism.7 ° Some metabo-
lites are pharmacologically active and influence either the brain or the func-
tioning of different organs in the body.7' Others are inactive and affect the
body in no way at all.72
There are a variety of factors that influence the speed of activation and
deactivation including, but not limited to, weight, gender, age, and mental
state. 73 In turn, these factors can determine how long drug metabolites re-
65. See infra Part III.D.
66. See infra Part I.E.
67. See Cordova, Jr., supra note 26, at 578-79 (detailing the breakdown of the psy-
choactive marijuana metabolite tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) that takes place after marijuana
is smoked); see also Calhoun, supra note 33, at 1126-38 (examining the aftereffects of meta-
bolizing marijuana and cocaine).
68. See Cordova, Jr., supra note 26, at 578-79.
69. Id. at 578-79.
70. Id. at 578-79.
71. Fiandach, supra note 53 (discussing the lack of pharmacological activity of carbo-
cyclic acid, a marijuana metabolite).
72. See State v. Franchetta, 925 A.2d 745, 747 (2007).
73. See Kimberly S. Keller, Sobering up Daubert: Recent Issues Arising in Alcohol-
Related Expert Testimony, 46 S. TEx. L. REV. 111, 124 (2004). This article examines the
inaccuracies of expert retrograde extrapolation, where an expert looks at two different blood-
alcohol concentrations taken from the defendant at different times, and then uses the differ-
ence between the two to calculate backward in time and determine the defendant's actual
2010]
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main in an individual's system, and how long they can be detected.74 Be-
cause most drug tests used in DUI cases do not take these factors into ac-
count, their credibility is diminished.75
2. Drug Testing
Drugs and their metabolites can be tested for in four ways: (1) urinaly-
sis, (2) oral fluid, (3) hair, and (4) blood.76 Urinalysis is the most common
method of testing, and is recognized as the industry standard." However,
drug metabolites can be detected in urine long after ingestion of the drug-
marijuana metabolites can be detected in urine up to two months after inges-
tion of marijuana.78 Urinalysis is also considered less accurate than a blood
sample for the simple reason that it does not show the amount of drugs ac-
tually present in the blood.79 For this reason, blood samples are also often
taken because they provide a clear indication of drug presence and current
state of impairment.8"
Specimens that are less frequently tested are hair and oral fluid."1 Al-
though both are considered less invasive than blood or urine samples, both
have their drawbacks.82 Hair samples are susceptible to environmental con-
tamination and can reveal drug use dating back months or years ago.83 Oral
fluid analysis is as effective as urinalysis for detection of recent use, but
costs approximately ten dollars more per specimen to analyze.84
concentration at the time of driving. Id. at 121. The article offers a variety of variables as
possible reasons for BAC test inaccuracies, including: weight, gender, age, mental state,
drinking pattern, type of alcohol, amount of alcohol, duration of the drinking spree, presence
of food in the stomach, and type of food. Id. at 124.
74. See id. at 125. See also Calhoun, supra note 33, at 1128-29.
75. See Stevens & Addison, supra note 34, at 20 (discussing a variety of shortcomings
in drug testing and possible causes).
76. Id. at 19; see generally Eric D. Wish & George S. Yacoubian, A Comparison of the
Intercept Oral Specimen Collection Device to Laboratory Urinalysis Among Baltimore City
Arrestees, 66 FED. PROBATION 27 (June 2002) (comparing oral fluid testing-a sample is
taken with a swab which is rubbed round the inside of the mouth-to urinalysis when testing
for marijuana, cocaine and opiates).
77. See Stevens & Addison, supra note 34, at 19; Wish & Yacoubian supra note 76, at
27.
78. See Stevens & Addison supra note 34, at 21 (charting a variety of drugs, including
alcohol, and the different lengths of time that can pass between ingestion and testing posi-
tive).
79. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 610 (1989).
80. See id.
81. See Stevens & Addison, supra note 34, at 19.
82. See id. at 19; Wish & Yacoubian, supra note 76, at 29.
83. Stevens & Addison, supra note 34, at 19 n.6.
84. Wish & Yacoubian, supra note 76, at 29.
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There are two tests that are applied to specimens of urine and blood-
the Immunoassay test and Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry test.
85
There are a number of factors that cause the Immunoassay test to be used
more often, the most notable of which are speed and cost.86 Even though
manufacturers of the test claim a 95 to 99 percent accuracy rate, there are a
number of shortcomings to the Immunoassay.8 The test has trouble distin-
guishing one type of drug from another-this can lead to false positive re-
suits,88 meaning that the results can come back positive for a drug that the
defendant never ingested.89 The test also fails to specify the amount of drug
detected-it only provides an estimated quantity.9°
A more precise, yet more costly test is the Gas Chromatography/Mass
Spectrometry test.9 Unlike the Immunoassay, this test is better able to dis-
tinguish one type of drug from another, is less likely to produce a false posi-
tive result, and can specify the amount of drug detected.92 Nevertheless, it is
substantially more expensive than the Immunoassay, and is therefore typi-
cally used only to confirm preliminary test results when needed.93
3. Relevance and Reliability of Test Results
Two theorists, Mark Stevens and James Addison, believe that drug test
results should not be heavily relied on in court.94 They argue that few people
in the legal community have a sufficient level of understanding of what drug
tests actually measure. 95 Little research has been done to correlate drug con-
sumption with level of impairment. 96 Moreover, most drug tests fail to pro-
vide any proof toward whether a person is under the influence of a drug.97 A
positive drug test establishes nothing more than some prior use or exposure
and is inadequate evidence of intoxication or impairment.98
85. Stevens & Addison, supra note 34, at 19.
86. Id. at 19.
87. Id. at 19-20.
88. Id. at 19.
89. Id. at 21-22 (discussing cross-reactivity-when a legal over-the-counter drug causes
a test sample to come back positive for the presence of illegal drugs or their metabolites-and
charting over-the-counter drugs against those illegal drugs which they may test positive for).
90. Id. at 19.
91. Stevens & Addison, supra note 34, at 20.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 18.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Stevens & Addison, supra note 34, at 18.
98. Id. at 20.
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In a 1983 study conducted on urine samples, 66.5% of the test results
were reported to be false positives.99 False positives abound for reasons such
as passive inhalation, improper laboratory procedures, contaminated labora-
tory equipment, mixed up samples, and cross-reactivity with other legal
drugs."° For these reasons, some contend that drug tests are often inaccu-
rate.101
Drug testing is also not regulated by the government.0 2 Administrators
and examiners are often not sufficiently competent to administer and ana-
lyze the tests.0 3 Toxicologists, pharmacologists, and other experts who
might testify about the intoxicating effects of drugs or their metabolites gen-
erally do not know enough to make any confident assertions about causa-
tion."° The main problem is that drug tests do not establish causation.0 5 For
these reasons, some argue that positive test results for drug metabolites
should not be heavily relied upon, especially if the metabolites are not
pharmacologically active. 
106
B. Sneaking Through the Rules of Evidence
This section will first outline Rule 404 of the Arkansas Rules of Evi-
dence and show how inactive metabolite evidence is exempt from the gener-
al inadmissibility of character evidence. Next, it will take a look at Rule 403
to see if the metabolite evidence passes its examination. Finally, the section
will consider the overall relevance of inactive metabolites as circumstantial
evidence in DUI cases.
1. Arkansas Rules of Evidence: Rule 404
Rule 404(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order
to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissi-
ble for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prepara-
tion, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.0 7
99. Id.
100. Id. at 21.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Stevens & Addison, supra note 34, at 21.
104. Id. at 22.
105. Id. at 22-23.
106. Id. at 21; see also State v. Franchetta, 925 A.2d 745, 747 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2007).
107. ARK. R. EviD. 404(b) (West 2009).
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A positive test result for a metabolite of an illegal drug is evidence of
prior ingestion of that illegal drug.' While an active metabolite might be
considered independently relevant to the main issue of whether the defen-
dant drove under the influence, an inactive metabolite probably could not,
for the simple reason that it adds nothing to the proof of influence.l°9
Influence is the main issue in a DUI case, 10 and evidence of an inactive
metabolite shows only that defendant (1) ingested a drug at some point in
the past, and (2) was not under the influence of the drug or its metabolites at
the time of testing."' The evidence by itself does nothing to prove up the
main issue." 2 For this reason, evidence of inactive metabolites would most
likely be considered nothing more than evidence of a prior wrong or act to
prove the character of the defendant."3
Nevertheless, evidence of inactive metabolites can escape the grip of
Rule 404 through the rule's exceptions clause." 4 Section (b) of Rule 404
explains that such evidence may be admitted to prove opportunity or prepa-
ration."' As stated earlier, evidence of inactive drug metabolites is evidence
of prior ingestion of that drug." 6 In order for a person to drive under the
influence of a drug, he needs to have first ingested the drug. Thus, this evi-
108. See Cordova, Jr., supra note 26, at 591 (admitting that even a miniscule amount of
drug metabolites may consist of proof that the defendant used drugs in the past); see also
State v. Franchetta, 925 A.2d 745, 747 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007); People v. McAfee,
104 P.3d 226, 228 (Colo. App. 2004); State v. McClain, 525 So.2d 420, 422.
109. See Cordova, Jr., supra note 26, at 591 (arguing that a low level of drug metabolites
in the defendant adds nothing toward making it more or less probable that the defendant was
intoxicated at the time of driving); see also Fiandach, supra note 53 (offering a direct exami-
nation during which "pharmacological activity" was defined as affecting, altering or influen-
cing either the functioning of the brain or different organs in the body); Franchetta, 925 A.2d
at 747 (acknowledging that the defendant was not under the pharmacological influence of
cocaine, because an inactive cocaine metabolite was all that he tested positive for); People v.
Derror, 715 N.W.2d 822, 830 (Mich. 2006) (acknowledging that the marijuana metabolite,
11 -carboxy-THC, has no pharmacological effect on the human body).
110. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-103 (West 2009) (stating that it is illegal to drive
intoxicated) with ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-102(2) (West 2009) (defining "intoxicated" as
influenced or affected by the ingestion of alcohol or a controlled substance).
111. See Calhoun, supra note 33, at 1128; see also Brown v. Ala. Elec. Co., 60 Ark. App.
138, 142, 959 S.W.2d 753, 755 (1998) (considering a doctor's report which stated the follow-
ing: "Impairment is a function of the level of the active parent drug which is presented to the
central nervous system . . . and bears no relationship to the metabolic level found in the
urine.").
112. See Cordova, Jr., supra note 26, at 591.
113. See Cordova, Jr., supra note 26, at 589; see also ARK. R. EVD. 404(b).
114. See Cordova, Jr., supra note 26, at 590; see also ARK. R. EvID. 404(b).
115. ARK. R. EvID. 404(b).
116. See supra note 51.
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dence is typically admitted to show that a DUI defendant either had the op-
portunity or prepared to drive under the influence."'
2. Arkansas Rules of Evidence: Rule 403
Rule 403. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, con-
fusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of un-
due delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence. 1
8
Before any type of evidence can enter the courtroom, it must pass the
scrutiny of Rule 403-the exclusionary rule for relevant evidence." 9 It states
that although evidence is relevant, it may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice against the defen-
dant. 2 It is at this point that the vast majority of courts and theorists col-
lide.''
First, the rule states that the evidence may be excluded.'22 That is to say
that the judge can still admit the evidence even if the probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.123 The growing debate,
however, concerns the competing weights of interest: society's interest in
punishing those who drive intoxicated and the defendant's interest in not
117. See Cordova, Jr., supra note 26, at 590; see also supra note 51.
118. ARK. R. EVID. 403.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Graham v. Tumage Employment Group, 60 Ark. App. 150, 157, 960 S.W.2d
453, 457 (1998) (Roaf, J., concurring). This is an Arkansas workers' compensation case in
which the injured worker was denied compensation because inactive marijuana metabolites
were detected in his urine. Id. at 152, 960 S.W.2d at 454. The worker testified that he smoked
marijuana seventeen days before the accident. Id. at 153, 960 S.W.2d at 455. In his concur-
rence, Judge Roaf admits that he affirmed the decision to deny compensation to the worker,
but that he did so only because the worker failed to raise the issue that would have allowed a
reversal-whether a test that shows only the presence of pharmacologically inactive metabo-
lites sufficiently demonstrates the presence of an illegal drug. Id. at 157, 960 S.W.2d at 457.
Compare Buckles v. State, 830 P.2d 702, 706 (N.J. 1992) (admitting evidence of cocaine
metabolites because additional circumstantial evidence increased its probative value) with
State v. McClain, 525 So.2d 420, 421 (Fla. 1988) (barring evidence of a trace amount of
cocaine because of the high risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant). Compare Cordova, Jr.,
supra note 26, at 588-92 (equating evidence of low levels of drug metabolites with nothing
more than character evidence that should be inadmissible) with Lewis & Buchan, supra note
26, at 38 (proposing a per se DUID law for Florida that would criminalize the act of driving
with any amount of controlled substance, metabolites or derivatives present in either the
blood or urine, regardless of the presence of alcohol as possible additional circumstantial
evidence).




being judged by a biased judge or jury.124 Most courts have held that, while
by itself metabolite evidence is inadmissible, additional circumstantial evi-
dence increases its probative weight.125 This additional weight, in effect, tips
the scale and the metabolite evidence is admissible. 26
This additional weight can be found in almost anything: (1) a police
record or testimony about the defendant's behavior or physical appearance,
(2) paraphernalia found on the defendant or in the car, (3) the defendant's
manner of driving, (4) a low BAC level, or (5) expert testimony.1 27 While
expert testimony is considered almost a prerequisite to proving a drug DUI
case, it often presents a double-edged sword for the prosecution. 2 The ex-
124. See supra note 51 & 56; see also Calhoun, supra note 33, at 1125. Lindsay Calhoun
points out that the Michigan DUI law-MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.625(8) (West
2006)-does not explicitly require actual intoxication at the time of driving. Calhoun, supra
note 33, at 1125. This lack of specification eventually led to the Supreme Court of Michigan,
in the case of People v. Derror, 715 N.W.2d 822 (Mich. 2006), enlisting any metabolites or
derivatives as evidence of driving under the influence, regardless of their intoxicating effect
or activity. Id. Calhoun notes that the "scientific debate surrounds whether metabolites can
and should be considered the same as the controlled substance itself." Id.
125. See, e.g., Buckles, 830 P.2d at 706.
126. See id.
127. See State v. Franchetta, 925 A.2d 745, 747 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (taking
note of the arresting officer's report, which stated the following: the defendant's speech was
slurred, his eyes were bloodshot, he appeared lethargic, incoherent, and could not stand with-
out assistance); State v. Bealor, 902 A.2d 226, 231 (N.J. 2006) (noting that there was no need
for an expert to interpret the positive test results for marijuana metabolites because there was
additional circumstantial evidence of the smell of marijuana, a marijuana smoking pipe, and
the overall appearance and conduct of the defendant); Buckles v. State, 830 P.2d 702, 706
(Wyo. 1992) (recognizing that evidence of the defendant's manner of driving would suffice
as a foundation to support the introduction of metabolites into evidence); State v. McClain,
525 So.2d 420, 423 (Fla. 1988) (pointing out that if there is additional circumstantial evi-
dence of impairment, a low or negative BAC level will, in effect, rule out alcohol as a possi-
ble cause of impairment, thereby adding more evidentiary weight to a positive test result for
drugs); Keller, supra note 73, at 129 (taking note of a dissenting opinion in Stewart v. State,
129 S.W.3d 93, 99-100 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Price, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that,
without expert retrograde extrapolation, the jury would be forced to perform its own crude
form of extrapolation; see also supra note 73 (explaining the process of retrograde extrapola-
tion).
128. See Keller, supra note 73, at 130-31 (considering the effect of excluding expert
testimony from cases in which BAC test results are being used as evidence of driving under
the influence); see also State v. Norton, No. 03C01-9707-CR-00270, 1999 WL 508654, at *2
(Tenn. Crim. App. July 20, 1999) (considering testimony from a director of pharmacy, af-
firming that while drug level data cannot be used to determine the actual effect on a specific
individual, it can be used to predict generally as to the effects of drug dosages). But see, e.g.,
Brown v. Ala. Elec. Co., 60 Ark. App. 138, 142, 959, S.W.2d 753, 755 (1998) (taking note of
a report by a pharmacologist on the defendant's positive test result for marijuana metabo-
lites-"I cannot determine when, in what manner, in what quantity, or whether legal or illegal
drug use occurred."); State v. McClain, 525 So.2d 420, 421 (Fla. 1988) ("The chemist was
unable to state whether or not the presence of the cocaine could have affected the manner of
McClain's driving."); Ashley v. Temporaries Plus, Inc., No. CA99-1049, 2000 WL 283916,
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pert is needed to both explain the test results, as well as predict from the
results whether the defendant was intoxicated at the time of driving. 9 Un-
fortunately, there is no consensus in the scientific community as to the quan-
tity of a particular drug needed to cause the average person to become intox-
icated. 3' Unlike alcohol, the effects and metabolic rate of drugs varies wild-
ly from one individual to the next. 3 ' Many experts refuse to make the pre-
diction of intoxication.'32
Moreover, a number of theorists will argue that the weight of unfair
prejudice is too heavy to be tipped by additional circumstantial evidence.'
The weight of unfair prejudice is created by the metabolite evidence's (1)
proof of a prior wrong act by the defendant, 34 and (2) lack of relevance to
the material issue of intoxication."' On the other side of the scale: the varie-
ty of factors that affect the metabolic process, the large margin for error in
testing procedures, the complete lack of proof of causation, and the fact that
inactive metabolites show nothing more than that a drug was ingested at
some point in the past; all of these shortcomings lessen the overall probative
weight.'36
at *5 (Ark. Ct. App. March 15, 2000) (considering testimony from a toxicologist, admitting
that "one cannot determine impairment based on a finding of cocaine metabolites"); Stevens
& Addison, supra note 34, at 22 (explaining why it is so difficult for experts to confidently
link positive drug test results to actual impairment-lack of published data on drug concen-
trations, no fixed relationship between the quantity detected and the defendant's conduct or
impairment, and drug tests' inability to determine the quantity of drug ingested, the drug's
potency, the frequency of ingestion, time of ingestion, or the drug's overall effect on the
individual).
129. See Lieutenant Colonel Michael R. Stahlman, New Developments on the Urinalysis
Front: A Green Light in Naked Urinalysis Prosecutions?, ARMY LAW 14, 17 (April, 2002)
(noting that expert testimony remains a necessary component to all military urinalysis cas-
es-necessary to establish the significance of a particular metabolite concentration level);
see, e.g., State v. Franchetta, 925 A.2d 745, 747 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). But see
Keller, supra note 73, at 129 (noting that in the case of Stewart v. State, 129 S.W.3d 93 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that drug test results are rele-
vant to a drug DUI case, even in the absence of expert extrapolation evidence).
130. See Stevens & Addison, supra note 34, at 22 ("there is no scientific evidence that
supports a fixed relationship between quantity detected and conduct or impairment").
131. Cordova, Jr., supra note 26, at 578 (pointing out that there are a multitude of bio-
chemical variables specific to the individual that can affect the metabolism of marijuana);
State v. Neal, No. M2001-00441-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31852854, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Dec. 19, 2002) (considering testimony from a forensic scientist, admitting that although hu-
mans metabolize cocaine in the same way, the rate of metabolism varies, and depends on a
variety of factors).
132. See supra note 127.
133. See Cordova, Jr., supra note 26, at 591; Stevens & Addison, supra note 34, at 23.
134. See Cordova, Jr., supra note 26, at 589; see also ARK. R. EVtD. 404(b).
135. See Cordova, Jr., supra note 26, at 591.
136. See generally Stevens & Addison, supra note 34.
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C. Cocaine Hangover v. Alcohol Withdrawal
This section will first look at the case of ERC Contractor Yard & Sales
v. Robertson, a workers' compensation case involving an injury held to be
caused not by alcohol use, but by alcohol withdrawal.1 7 It will then consider
the case of State v. Franchetta and its introduction of the "cocaine hangov-
er.' ' 138 Next, the two court rationales will be considered in light of the differ-
ent causation standards that each employed. Finally, the rationales will be
considered under the lens of Arkansas's DUI law.
1. ERC Contractor Yard & Sales v. Robertson
In Robertson, Mr. Robertson was granted workers' compensation for
an injury caused by a seizure from alcohol withdrawal.'39 Under Arkansas
law, a work-related injury is not compensable if it is substantially occa-
sioned by the use of alcohol. 40 A blood sample from Mr. Robertson re-
vealed a BAC of .01%.' 41 Mr. Robertson's girlfriend told the doctors that he
drank two beers the day before the accident. 4 2 Finally, medical reports
noted that Mr. Robertson had a faint smell of alcohol on his breath the day
of the injury. 43
Instead of considering the medical reports and the girlfriend's state-
ment, however, the court chose to analyze the workers' compensation sta-
tute. 44 It looked at the plain and ordinary meaning of the law and made a
distinction between an injury caused by the use of alcohol and one caused
by abstinence from alcohol. 145 Using this distinction, the court was able to
conclude that Mr. Robertson's injury was compensable because his injury
was not substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol, but by abstinence
from it.'
46
137. ERC Contractor Yard & Sales v. Robertson, 335 Ark. 63, 71, 977 S.W.2d 212, 216
(1998).
138. State v. Franchetta, 925 A.2d 745, 746 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).
139. Robertson, 335 Ark. at 67, 977 S.W.2d at 216.
140. Id. at 68, 977 S.W.2d at 214.
141. Id. at 66, 977 S.W.2d at 213.
142. Id. at 66-67, 977 S.W.2d at 214.
143. Id. at 67, 977 S.W.2d at 214.
144. Id. at 71, 977 S.W.2d at 216.
145. Robertson, 335 Ark. at 71, 977 S.W.2d at 216.
146. Id., 977 S.W.2d at 216.
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2. State v. Franchetta
In Franchetta, the court concluded that prior ingestion of cocaine prox-
imately caused the defendant's impaired driving via a cocaine hangover. 47
Even though there was no cocaine in the defendant's blood at the time the
sample was taken, the court was able to use the definition of "under the in-
fluence" to make the causal connection. 4
"Under the influence" was defined as a substantial deterioration of
mental or physical capabilities, caused by alcohol or drugs, so as to render a
person dangerous while driving.'49 There was no requirement that any
amount of cocaine be in Franchetta's system at the time of the traffic stop.
50
The only requirements were that his mental or physical capabilities be sub-
stantially deteriorated, and that the deterioration be caused by ingestion of
cocaine. 15'
Other possible causes of Franchetta's impaired driving-lack of sleep,
illness, etc.-were ruled out.'52 One cause not ruled out was Franchetta's
prior ingestion of cocaine, revealed by the presence of a cocaine metabolite
in his blood.'53 Finally, Dr. George Godfrey testified that a person is consi-
dered under the influence of a drug, medically speaking, as long as there
remains some physiological response to that drug, whether it is caused di-
rectly or indirectly.'54 From the foregoing evidence, the jury concluded
beyond a reasonable doubt that Franchetta's prior ingestion of cocaine prox-
imately caused his impaired driving.'55
3. Direct Cause v. Probable Cause
The different outcomes in these cases might be attributed to the differ-
ent causation requirements. In Robertson, the court opined that "substantial-
ly occasioned" required a direct causal link between the use of alcohol and
the injury.'56 In Franchetta, the court borrowed a proximate cause analysis
147. State v. Franchetta, 925 A.2d 745, 749 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).




152. Id. at 747.
153. Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 749.
154. See id. at 747. The doctor prefaced his comment with "Drugs can cause effect, but
after they have had their effect, there can be a carry over action on the part of the body which
affects coordination and function of the body.... And in this instance, the coordination part
is a rebound effect from that high." Id.
155. Id. at 749.




used in State v. Bealor, a case that considered whether an individual was
under the influence of marijuana.'
There are three elements that must be satisfied in order to establish
proximate cause: (1) factual cause, (2) legal cause, and (3) no superseding
cause. 5 Factual cause is established if the injury would not have occurred
absent the defendant's act.'59 Legal cause is established if the injury is a
direct and natural result of the defendant's act."6 Finally, if there is no rea-
sonably foreseeable intervening cause that would break the causal link be-
tween the defendant's act and the injury, there is no superseding cause and
proximate cause is established. 161
Because there is no mention of a need for direct causation, it might be
inferred that a proximate cause could be indirect, so long as there is no su-
perseding cause. 62 If this is indeed the case, then the requirement of causa-
tion is stricter in a workers' compensation case than it is in a DWI case.' 63 In
Robertson, more evidence would have been needed to establish a direct
causal link between Mr. Robertson's alcohol use and his injury, than was
needed to establish proximate cause in Franchetta.6' However, the court in
Robertson barely considered causation because it found that Mr. Robertson
did not use alcohol before the injury. 65 This statutory element needed to be
established before causation could be considered."6
A possible reason for the different causation requirements is the differ-
ence in statutory language used in New Jersey DWI law and that of Arkan-
sas workers' compensation law. 67 The difference is the employment of the
word "use" in the workers' compensation statute versus "under the influ-
ence" in the DWI statute. 68 In Robertson, the injury sustained by Mr. Ro-
bertson was held to be caused not by his use, but by his lack of use of alco-
hol. 69 Even though the seizure might have been held to be indirectly caused
by Mr. Robertson's prior extended use of alcohol, the fact that the use was
157. Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 749.
158. See People v. Schaefer, 703 N.W.2d 774, 785-86 (Mich. 2005).
159. Id. at 785.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See id at 785-86.
163. See id.; see also Robertson, 335 Ark. at 71, 977 S.W.2d at 216.
164. See Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 749; see also Robertson, 335 Ark. at 67, 977 S.W.2d at
214.
165. Robertson, 335 Ark. at 71, 977 S.W.2d at 216.
166. See id., 977 S.W.2d at 216.
167. Compare id. at 68, 977 S.W.2d at 213 with Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 748.
168. Compare Robertson, 335 Ark. at 68, 977 S.W.2d at 213 with Franchetta, 925 A.2d
at 748.
169. Robertson, 335 Ark. at 71, 977 S.W.2d at 216.
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not a direct cause was enough to take his injury out from under the statutory
language. 7
In Franchetta, the court considered the phrase "under the influence."''
The fact that no cocaine or active metabolite was present in Franchetta's
blood was of no consequence.' 72 All that was required by the language of the
statute was that he still be under the influence of the cocaine.' The court
concluded that the indirect effect of Franchetta's prior ingestion of cocaine,
proved by the existence of cocaine metabolites in his blood, was enough to
cause him to be under the influence. 74 This indirect effect was branded the
"hangover effect," and was deemed to constitute the after-effects of the drug
on the body after the active ingredients no longer exist. 7 The drug was no
longer influencing Franchetta's body, but rather his body was influencing
itself via recovery from the drug.'76
Likewise, the court in Robertson concluded that Mr. Robertson's sei-
zure was caused by his withdrawal from alcohol via his body's recovery
from his prior use of alcohol) 77 Yet, this indirect effect of Mr. Robertson's
prior alcohol use was found to be too attenuated from his injury to find it
noncompensable' 78 The different outcomes in these two cases are likely
attributable to the different causation standards established by the different
statutory language.179
4. Under Arkansas's DUI Law
To be considered under the influence of alcohol or a controlled sub-
stance under Arkansas DUI law, a driver must be controlled or affected by
the ingestion of the alcohol or controlled substance. 80 Mr. Robertson was
considered to be under the influence of a withdrawal from alcohol.18' Mr.
Franchetta was determined by the Superior Court of New Jersey to be under
the influence of a cocaine hangover. 2 Some aspects of a drug hangover are
170. Id.,977 S.W.2d at 216.
171. Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 748.
172. Id. at 749.
173. Id. at 748.
174. See id. at 749.
175. See id. at 747.
176. Seeid.
177. ERC Contractor Yard & Sales v. Robertson, 335 Ark. 63, 71, 977 S.W.2d 212, 216
(1998).
178. See id., 977 S.W.2d at 216.
179. Compare id., 977 S.W.2d at 216 with Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 748.
180. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-302 (West 2009); e.g., Mace v. State, 328 Ark. 536, 540,
944 S.W.2d 830, 833 (1997).
181. See Robertson, 335 Ark. at 71, 977 S.W.2d at 216.
182. Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 749.
[Vol. 32
CRIMINAL LAW
believed to be caused by a withdrawal from whatever drug was originally
ingested.I"3 Biochemically speaking, both men were under the influence of
an absence of a toxin.' Whether they would be found guilty of DUI in Ar-
kansas would depend on what causal analysis would be employed-
Franchetta's proximate cause analysis, or Robertson's substantially occa-
sioned analysis requiring a direct causal link.
D. Metabolite + Driving = DUI in Michigan
This section will examine People v. Derror, a 2006 case in which the
Supreme Court of Michigan held that 11-carboxy-THC, an inactive metabo-
lite of THC, a psychoactive ingredient of marijuana, should be considered a
schedule 1 controlled substance. 5 The focus of this section, however, will
be on the dissent's rationale, contending that the majority's ruling is uncons-
titutional on three grounds: (1) it does not provide for fair notice, (2) it al-
lows for arbitrary enforcement, and (3) it bares no rational relationship to
the legislative objective of the DUI. 18 6
1. Majority: Marijuana Metabolite is a Schedule 1 Controlled
Substance
Two blood samples were taken from Derror, and an inactive marijuana
metabolite, 1 1-carboxy-THC, was found. 8 7 Under Michigan DUI law, a
person shall not drive if any amount of a schedule 1 controlled substance is
present in that person's body. 88 The Michigan Supreme Court was asked to
determine whether 1 -carboxy-THC is a schedule 1 controlled substance.
189
In making this determination, the court first looked to the Public Health
Code's definition of marijuana, which included every compound and deriva-
tive of the plant, seeds, and resin. 90 One definition of derivative equated a
derivative of THC with any chemical substance related structurally to THC,
and that theoretically can be derived from it.'9' From this definition, the
court was able to qualify 1 -carboxy-THC as a derivative of THC.' 92 Be-
183. See Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 747; Buckles v. State, 830 P.2d 702, 706 (Wyo. 1992);
Fiandach, supra note 53 ("Current literature does indicate that there is a 'hangover' affect to
marijuana").
184. See Robertson, 335 Ark. at 71, 977 S.W.2d at 216; Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 749.
185. People v. Derror, 715 N.W.2d 822, 831 (Mich. 2006).
186. Id. at 843-45 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 827.
189. Id. at 825.
190. Id. at 828.




cause THC is an ingredient of marijuana, and because the definition of mari-
juana includes all derivatives, the court concluded that I1 -carboxy-THC fell
within the definition of marijuana, making it a schedule 1 controlled sub-
stance under the Michigan DUI statute.'93
Concerning the legislative purpose behind enacting the DUI statute, the
majority agreed that the intent was to prevent people from driving with any
amount of a schedule 1 controlled substance in the body.194 It did not matter
whether the substance was influencing the person while he was driving.'95
According to the majority, the legislature equated the presence of any
amount of a controlled substance with being under the influence of that sub-
stance.
2. Dissent: The Majority Fails to Consider Effects of Metabolite
Judge Michael Cavanagh dissented to the majority's ruling for several
reasons.'96 First, he maintained that federal law defines marijuana as any
part of the plant that contains THC. 197 Any derivatives or metabolites of
THC are not included in the definition. 98 As the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held, the legislative purpose of outlawing marijuana was to prohibit
the euphoric effects produced by THC. 9 9 Metabolite I l-carboxy-THC does
not produce any euphoric effect; therefore, the legislature most likely did
not intend to outlaw it. 200
Second, the majority failed to consider certain factors before classify-
ing 11 -carboxy-THC as a schedule 1 drug.'O° A few of the factors include:
(1) the actual or relative potential for abuse; (2) the scientific evidence of the
drug's pharmacological effect; (3) the scope, duration and significance of
abuse; and (4) the potential of the substance to produce psychic or physio-
logical dependence. 0 2 Had the majority taken these factors into account,
they might have realized that there is no potential for abuse or dependence
because 11 -carboxy-THC does not produce any euphoric effect.0 3
193. Id. at 831.
194. Id. at 834-35.
195. Id. at 835.
196. Id. at 836-46.
197. Derror, 715 N.W.2d at 838.
198. See id.
199. Id. at 837-38.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 840.
202. Id.
203. Derror, 715 N.W.2d at 840 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
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3. Dissent: The Majority's Holding Is Unconstitutional
Finally, Judge Cavanagh asserted that the majority's interpretation of
the Michigan DUI statute is unconstitutional.2' 4 First, it fails to provide an
ordinary person with fair notice about exactly what conduct is prohibited. z 5
The statute prohibits driving with any amount of a schedule I controlled
substance in the body.06 Marijuana metabolites can be detected in the blood
weeks after marijuana is ingested.0 7 Without a prior blood test, it would be
almost impossible for an individual who ingested marijuana to know when
he or she could legally drive again. s8
Second, the majority's interpretation allows for arbitrary and discrimi-
natory enforcement.0 9 As long as any amount of I1 -carboxy-THC can be
detected in a person's body, it is illegal for that person to drive. 210 As
science progresses, smaller amounts of 1 -carboxy-THC will be able to be
detected.21' Judge Cavanagh argues that eventually there will be potential for
a person who ingested marijuana a year ago to be found guilty of violating
the Michigan DUI statute because of a remote amount of I1 -carboxy-THC
found in the person's body.'
12
Third, designating 1 -carboxy-THC as a controlled substance is not ra-
tionally related to the legislative purpose of the statute.2 3 The objective of
the statute is to deter people from driving under the influence of marijua-
na.214 1 1-carboxy-THC stays in a person's body long after the influence of
the marijuana has ended.215 By labeling 11-carboxy-THC as a schedule 1
controlled substance, the majority has in effect made it illegal to drive after
ingesting marijuana, regardless of whether the driver is under the influence
of it.216
4. Dissent: The Potential Windfall Effect
While Judge Cavanagh concedes in his dissent that the presence of 1 1-
carboxy-THC could be used as circumstantial evidence, he maintains that





209. Derror, 715 N.W.2d at 845 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 843.
211. See id.
212. Id. at 845.
213. Id.
214. Id.




evidence of impairment is essential.217 In a Wyoming DUI case, it was stated
that there needs to be some additional evidence of impairment before the
presence of metabolites in the defendant's body can be admitted into evi-
dence.1 8 Evidence of the manner in which the defendant was driving could
be enough to allow for the evidence of metabolites to be admitted.219 In State
v. Franchetta, there was additional evidence that Franchetta's speech was
slurred, his eyes were bloodshot, he was lethargic, incoherent and could not
stand without assistance.22 ° It is likely because of this additional evidence of
impairment that the evidence of the inactive cocaine metabolite, benzolec-
tamine, was admitted into evidence.22'
On the other hand, Judge Cavanagh brings to light the possible windfall
effect of placing too much deference on the presence of inactive metabo-
lites.222 As stated earlier, the objective behind the Michigan DUI statute is to
deter people from driving while under the influence of drugs.223 If a metabo-
lite has no pharmacological effect, it is unable to influence the body of the
driver.224 Moreover, some inactive drug metabolites can be found in the
blood or urine weeks after ingestion.225 But simply because they exist con-
currently with some additional evidence of impairment, they can be admit-
ted into evidence.2 6 It is this one additional piece of evidence that might
very well unfairly prejudice, and turn the jury against, an innocent defen-
dant.227
E. DUI Law v. DUID Law
This final section will begin by simply laying out the Arkansas DUI
law. The DUI!DUID laws of Nevada, Ohio, and Virginia will follow. The
section will conclude with a comparison of the stark difference in specificity
of the statutory language.
217. Id at 846.
218. Buckles v. State, 830 P.2d 702, 706 (Wyo. 1992).
219. Id.
220. State v. Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 747.
221. See id.; see also Buckles, 830 P.2d at 706.
222. See Derror, 715 N.W.2d at 836.
223. Id. at 845 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
224. See Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 747.
225. Derror, 715 N.W.2d at 843 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
226. See Buckles, 830 P.2d at 706.
227. See State v. McClain, 525 So.2d 420, 422 (1988).
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1. Driving While Intoxicated in Arkansas228
Arkansas's DUI law is remarkably similar to the majority of state DUI
laws in the United States,229 minus the sixteen states that have enacted DUID
laws.23" The Arkansas DUI law states: "It is unlawful... for any person to
operate or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle if at that time" the
person is intoxicated, or "the alcohol concentration in the person's breath or
blood was eight-hundredths (0.08) or more. 231
Anyone in Arkansas operating or in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while intoxicated is guilty of driving while intoxicated (DWI).232 A
person is intoxicated when he or she is under the influence of alcohol, a con-
trolled substance, any intoxicant, or any combination thereof, to such a de-
gree that reactions, motor skills, and judgment are substantially altered, pre-
senting a clear and substantial danger of physical injury or death if that per-
son is driving.2 33 To be considered under the influence of a controlled sub-
stance-e.g. marijuana or cocaine234 -a driver must be controlled or af-
fected by the ingestion of the controlled substance to such a degree that the
driver's reactions, motor skills, and judgment are altered or diminished,
even to the slightest scale.235
In order to prove that a defendant was driving under the influence of a
controlled substance in Arkansas, the following three elements must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant was driving or in ac-
tual physical control of a motor vehicle, (2) he or she was sufficiently im-
paired to create a substantial danger as a driver, and (3) the impairment was
the result of ingestion of a controlled substance.2 36 Direct evidence is not
228. For the purpose of this note, DUI (driving under the influence) is equivalent to DWI
(driving while intoxicated).
229. See supra note 30.
230. See supra notes 26 & 28.
231. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-103(b) (West 2009).
232. Id.
233. Id. at § 5-65-102.
234. See State v. McMullen, 302 Ark. 252, 260-61, 789 S.W.2d 715, 719-20 (1990)
(naming marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance); Williams v. State, 94 Ark. App.
440, 446, 236 S.W.3d 519, 523 (2006) (naming cocaine as a Schedule II controlled sub-
stance).
235. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-302 (West 2009); e.g., Mace v. State, 328 Ark. 536, 540,
944 S.W.2d 830, 833 (1997).
236. Roach v. State, 30 Ark. App. 119, 122-23, 783 S.W.2d 376, 377-78 (1990). Com-
pare ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-103 (West 2009) with ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-102 (West 2009)
(defining the terms "intoxicated" and "controlled substance") and ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-
302 (West 2009) (defining the term "influence").
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necessary.237 Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to sustain a convic-
tion if it constitutes substantial evidence.23
While the statute quantifies a .08 level of blood-alcohol concentration
necessary to create a per se presumption of intoxication, the statute fails to
prescribe similar quantities for controlled substances or metabolites that
might be found in the blood or urine.239 This lack of specificity leaves the
realm of drugged driving open to over-reaching judicial interpretation.24 °
2. Driving Under the Influence in Nevada, Ohio, and Virginia
a. Nevada
The Nevada DUIiDUID law is entitled "Driving Under the Influence of
Intoxicating Liquor or Controlled or Prohibited Substance." The DUI sec-
tion of the law states in relevant part that "it is unlawful for any person who
... has a concentration of alcohol of 0.08 or more in his blood or breath...
to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle on a highway or on
premises to which the public has access.241 The DUID section continues on,
however, to illegalize driving with the following amounts of prohibited sub-
stances, among others, in the blood or urine:242
Prohibited substance: Urine Nanograms Blood Nanograms
Per milliliter Per milliliter
(a) Amphetamine 500 100
(b) Cocaine 150 50
(c) Cocaine metabolite 150 50
(g) Marijuana 10 2
(h) Marijuana metabo- 15 5243
lite
237. Roach, 30 Ark. App. at 123, 783 S.W.2d at 378.
238. Id., 783 S.W.2d at 378.
239. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-103(b) (West 2009) with NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
484.379 (West 2009). In addition to specifying a .08% BAC, the Nevada law lists specific
quantities of controlled substances and their metabolites necessary to establish a per se pre-
sumption of impairment. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.3 79(3). Note that the .08% BAC is
the same for both blood and breath. See id. An individual's blood-alcohol concentration can
be detected from either a blood or breath sample. See Keller, supra note 73, at 121 (indicating
that, in the criminal context, a breath sample is typically taken to determine the level of alco-
hol in the suspect's blood; in the civil context, a blood sample is typically taken to determine
the same thing).
240. See supra note 33.
241. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.379(1)(b) (West 2009).
242. Id.
243. Id. at § 484.379(3) (also covering (1) heroine, (2) two different types of heroine
metabolites, (3) lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), (4) methamphetamine, and (5) phencycli-
dine); see Hudson v. State, 316 Ark. 360, 361, 872 S.W.2d 68, 69 (1994) (acknowledging the




The extensive Ohio DUI/DUID law is entitled "Operation of Motor
Vehicle While Intoxicated.",2" The DUI section begins with laying out the
universally accepted BAC limit of .08%.245 Unlike the Nevada law, howev-
er, Ohio law also specifies quantities for alcohol concentration in blood se-
rum, blood plasma and urine.246 From there, it moves on to the DUID sec-
tion with quantity specifications for most of the same drugs and metabolites
covered under the Nevada law.247 After covering drugs and their metabo-
lites, the statute continues on to specify different alcohol quantities for
people under the age of twenty-one. 248 Next, it moves on to criminal prose-
cution and juvenile court proceedings;249 then to testing procedures,5  who
can be considered immune from criminal and civil liability,25' fines and sen-
tencing guidelines; 22 and finally to affirmative defenses for either those
with a prescription for a controlled substance, or who ingested it in accor-
dance with a doctor's direction.253
c. Virginia
Of the three states with DUJIDUID laws that specify the minimum
quantities of drugs and their metabolites necessary to create a per se pre-
sumption of intoxication, Virginia specifies the least amount of drugs, and
includes none of their metabolites 54 The statute is entitled "Driving Motor
Vehicle, Etc., While Intoxicated." The DUI section begins by enlisting the
typical .08 BAC for blood or breath samples. The DUID section, on the oth-
er hand, outlaws driving with only the following amounts of substances in
the body:
(a) 0.02 milligrams of cocaine per liter of blood,
244. See generally OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (West 2009).
245. Id. at § 4511.19(A)(1)(b) & (d) (subsection (b) requiring .08% of alcohol per unit
volume of the blood, and subsection (d) requiring .08% of alcohol per 210 liters of breath).
246. Id. at § 4511.19(A)(1)(c) & (e) (subsection (c) designating the blood serum and
plasma quantities, and subsection (e) designating the urine quantities).
247. Id. at § 4511.19(A)(1)(j) (covering (1) amphetamines, (2) cocaine and any of its
metabolites, (3) heroine and any of its metabolites, (4) LSD, (5) marijuana and any of its
metabolites, (6) methamphetamines, (7) phencyclidine, and (8) salvia divinorum).
248. Id. at §4511.19(B).
249. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.19(D) (West 2009).
250. Id. at § 4511.19(E).
251. Id. at§4511.19(F).
252. ld. at§4511.19(G).
253. Id. at § 4511.19(K)
254. Compare VA. CODE ANN § 18.2-266 (West 2009) with OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
4511.19 (West 2009), andNEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.379 (West 2009).
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(b) 0.1 milligrams of methamphetamine per liter of blood,
(c) 0.01 milligrams of phencyclidine per liter of blood, or
(d) 0.1 milligrams of 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine per liter of
blood.255
3. Arkansas as a DUI/DUID State
Although the realm of drug testing is saturated with uncertainty, fos-
tered by too many inaccuracies and indeterminable variables, it is getting
better, and more precise. So too should the language of the law get better
and more precise. As the Arkansas DUI law is currently written, it is open
and susceptible to the judicial misinterpretation that has already contami-
nated too many courtrooms.
An ideal DUlD law specifies quantities for both controlled substances
and their active metabolites, protects the accused from bias and social con-
tempt for drug use, and simplifies the prosecution process-the driver is
either above the legal limit or below it, same as with alcohol. Arkansas
needs to stop the possible judicial speculation at the threshold and adopt a
modified version of one of the three DUI/DUID laws which specify mini-
mum drug and metabolite quantities. In addition, the Arkansas legislature
needs to explicitly exempt pharmacologically inactive metabolites from
evidentiary consideration.
IV. PROPOSAL
This section of the note will begin with a brief explanation of why the
New Jersey Superior Court's decision in State v. Franchetta was incor-
rect.256 Next, it will revisit the Arkansas Rules of Evidence and establish
how the probative value of pharmacologically inactive metabolites is sub-
stantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice against the defen-
dant. Finally, the proposal will make its plea for the obvious remedy to the
drug metabolite dilemma: Adopt a DUI/DUID law that specifies minimum
quantities for controlled substances and their active metabolites.
255. VA. CODE ANN § 18.2-266 (West 2009). One noteworthy aspect of the Virginia
DUI/DUID law is the requirement under subsection (iii) that the narcotic drug or intoxicant
be self-administered. See id. The impaired driving laws of Nevada, Ohio and Arkansas do not
specify such a requirement. See NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.379 (West 2009); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (West 2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-103 (West 2009).
256. See supra Parts I-l.
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A. State v. Franchetta Was Incorrect
State v. Franchetta introduced the concept of a cocaine "hangover.
' 257
The court was able to employ this concept in order to sustain a DUI convic-
tion by (1) defining "under the influence" as a substantial deterioration of
mental or physical capabilities, caused by alcohol or drugs, so as to render a
person dangerous while driving, 58 and (2) using the following evidence to
place Franchetta under this definition: lethargia, incoherency, blood-shot
eyes, slurred speech, not being able to stand without assistance, and the
presence of the cocaine metabolite, benzolectamine, in his blood.259
However, benzolectamine is an inactive cocaine metabolite.26° It has no
pharmacological effect on the body, and therefore, does not influence the
body in any way.261 Its only evidentiary purpose is to show that a defendant
ingested cocaine at some time in the past.262 For this reason, the evidence of
benzolectamine should not have been considered in Franchetta.263 Under
Rule 403 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, the metabolite's probative
value would be substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice
against the defendant. 2' Had this evidence not been considered, the court
would have been unable to establish that Franchetta was under the influence
of any drug, and thus unable to sustain a DUI conviction.265 For this reason,
the outcome in State v. Franchetta was incorrect.
B. Probative Value v. Unfair Prejudice-The Rules of Evidence Revisited
According to the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of
unfair prejudice against the defendant.266 When applying this balancing test,
the court should consider (1) the need for the evidence, (2) the tendency of
the evidence to suggest to the jury an improper basis for resolving the mat-
ter, (3) the chain of inference necessary to establish the material fact, and (4)
the effectiveness of limiting the jury instruction.267
Unless there is some additional circumstantial evidence of intoxication,
a judge will usually not admit into evidence positive test results for drug
257. 925 A.2d 745, 746 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 2007).
258. Id. at 748.
259. Id. at 747.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See Calhoun, supra note 33, at 1138.
263. See State v. McClain, 525 So.2d 420, 423 (Fla. 1988).
264. See id. See also ARK. R. EvID. 403.
265. See Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 747.
266. ARK. R. EVID. 403.
267. McClain, 525 So.2d at 422.
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metabolites.268 In other words, a positive test result for drug metabolites,
alone, is (1) not sufficient evidence to prove a DUI charge beyond a reason-
able doubt, and (2) likely to unfairly prejudice the defendant.2 69 However, if
there is additional circumstantial evidence, even if only slight, a judge will
typically admit the drug metabolites into evidence.27 Because the probative
value of the metabolites increases with additional evidence of intoxica-
tion,27" ' the metabolites themselves may then be considered circumstantial
evidence of intoxication.272
What courts fail to consider in determining the admissibility of metabo-
lite evidence is the pharmacological effect of metabolites.273 The court in
Franchetta discussed the lack of pharmacological activity of the cocaine
metabolite, but only to establish the causal link between ingestion and being
under the influence of the cocaine, not its metabolite.274 It was not discussed
to determine whether the metabolite evidence should have been admitted.275
The fact that the metabolite was inactive and not influencing David's body
or mind should have been considered before allowing it to tip the scales
toward David's DUI conviction.276 Indeed, it should be discussed in every
case involving drug metabolites offered as evidence of intoxication.
Under Arkansas law, anyone operating or in actual physical control of
a motor vehicle while intoxicated is guilty of DUI.277 A person is intoxicated
when he or she is under the influence of a controlled substance to such a
degree that reactions, motor skills and judgment are substantially altered,
making it a clear and substantial danger of physical injury or death for the
person to be driving.278 To be considered under the influence of a controlled
substance, a driver must be controlled or affected by the ingestion of a con-
trolled substance at the time of driving.279
If a metabolite is active at the time of driving, then it is influencing the
body or mind in some way at the time of driving.280 If a metabolite is inac-
tive at the time of driving, then it is influencing neither at the time of driv-
268. See Buckles v. State, 830 P.2d 702, 706 (Wyo. 1992).
269. See McClain, 525 So.2d at 422.
270. See, e.g., Buckles, 830 P.2d at 706.
271. See, e.g., id.
272. See, e.g., id.
273. See Williams v. State, 710 So.2d 24, 40 n.32 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1998); see also
McClain, 525 So.2d at 422.
274. Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 749.
275. See generally id.
276. See id. at 747; see also Fiandach, supra note 53.
277. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-103 (West 2009).
278. Id. at § 5-65-102.
279. Id. at § 5-65-302; e.g., Mace v. State, 328 Ark. 536, 540, 944 S.W.2d 830, 833
(1997).
280. See Fiandach, supra note 53.
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ing.2s1 An inactive metabolite could be construed as evidence of past inges-
tion of a controlled substance, but not as evidence of being under the influ-
ence of that substance.282 If anything, it should be construed as evidence of
not being under the influence of a controlled substance-same as a negative
drug test result. This is as far as its probative value should be allowed to
stretch.
Aside from having a low probative value, evidence of inactive metabo-
lites unfairly prejudices the defendant. First, it makes a blatant suggestion to
the jury to resolve the issue of whether a DUI was committed on the impro-
per basis of illegal drug use. Second, the chain of inference necessary to
establish the material issue of whether the defendant was intoxicated at the
time of driving is too attenuated. Positive test results for inactive metabolites
establish two facts: (1) the defendant was not under the influence at the time
of testing, and (2) the defendant ingested a controlled substance at some
time in the past.283 Currently, drug tests are not precise enough to determine,
at the time of testing, whether the defendant was under the influence at the
time of driving.284 Nor are they precise enough to determine whether the
defendant was under the influence to such a degree as to be considered in-
toxicated at the time of driving.
2 85
Finally, a limiting jury instruction would be ineffective. It is beyond
reasonable expectations to expect a jury in a DUI case involving drugs to
disregard the fact that the defendant ingested a controlled substance at some
point in the past. For the foregoing reasons, positive test results for inactive
metabolites should not be admitted into evidence. The probative value is
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice against the defen-
dant.
C. Arkansas Should Join the Ranks of DUI/DUID States
By considering evidence of inactive drug metabolites as circumstantial
evidence of driving under the influence of drugs, courts are in effect punish-
ing drug users for driving, regardless of intoxication at the time of driving.
The argument made in State v. Franchetta was that the prior ingestion of
cocaine proximately caused David's impaired driving by way of a "cocaine
hangover." 286 Yet, David was neither under the influence of the cocaine nor
281. Seeid.
282. See Cordova, Jr., supra note 26, at 591.
283. See supra note 6; State v. Franchetta, 925 A.2d 745, 747 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
2007).
284. See Stevens & Addison, supra note 34, at 21; Keller, supra note 73, at 124.
285. See Stevens & Addison, supra note 34, at 21; Keller, supra note 73, at 124.
286. Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 749.
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its metabolites.287 He was merely under the influence of recovery from the
cocaine use.28" This type of influence is not mentioned in the New Jersey
DUI law, 289 but it was enough for the appeals court to sustain a conviction
under it.2
90
This broad interpretation of "under the influence" for the purpose of a
DUI conviction allows for the possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. 291 Exaggerating this interpretation a bit, police officers could
potentially start handing out DUI citations to anyone driving conspicuously,
and later secure the conviction as long as the driver ingested a controlled
substance at some point in the past. After all, it would be relatively easy to
fabricate additional circumstantial evidence (e.g. erratic driving, lethargy,
incoherency) in order to introduce evidence of drug metabolites.
The Arkansas legislature should stand up and block this sweeping dis-
crimination at the threshold. The sensitivity of chemical testing has caught
up with, and is in the process of surpassing, the imprecise language of DUI
laws.292 For this reason, these laws must be updated and limited. The Arkan-
sas DUI law currently requires a specific blood-alcohol concentration of
.08% for driving while intoxicated by alcohol.293 The legislature needs to set
similar limits for controlled substances and their active metabolites.
Nevada, Ohio, and Virginia DUI/DUID laws make such limits, and the
prohibited amounts are set at the various levels at which scientific findings
indicate that an average driver would be experiencing a "high."'294 Unfortu-
nately, they do not discriminate between active and inactive metabolites.295
It is time for Arkansas to join the ranks of DUI/DUID states, and amend its
current DUI law to include these limits. Moreover, the Arkansas legislature
should expressly eliminate evidence of pharmacologically inactive drug
metabolites from juridical consideration.
Matthew C. Rappold
287. See id. at 747.
288. See id.
289. N.J. STAT. ANN. 39:4-50 (West 2009).
290. See Franchetta, 925 A.2d at 749.
291. Cf People v. Derror, 715 N.W.2d 822, 845 (Mich. 2006) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
292. See id. at 843.
293. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-103 (West 2009).
294. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484.379 (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19
(West 2009); VA. CODE ANN § 18.2-266 (West 2009).
295. See id.
* The author is a New Orleans native and a 2010 graduate of the UALR Bowen
School of Law.
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